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# SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS. — *Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Mon.* = *Philosophische Monatshefte; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

## LOGICAL.

### *Zur Theorie der Beobachtung.* BENNO ERDMANN. Ar. f. sys. Ph., I, 1, pp. 14–33; 2, pp. 145–164.

These papers attempt to exhibit, with a view to logical purposes, the elementary ingredients of the concept and the elementary kinds of scientific observation. Confining ourselves to sensuous perception, we may say that *all* observation rests on apperceptive or attentive perception. Apperception is used here simply as a comprehensive term to designate the content of those reproductive processes that accompany every perception of the developed consciousness. Of apperceptive sensuous perception two kinds may be distinguished, the immediate and the mediate. In the former, the elements are assimilated; in the latter, the associative process is mediated by memory-images. Perception of the latter kind is the more common. Now one kind of observation is the Scientific, which may be defined as attentive sensuous perception for the purpose of determining according to concepts the object of perception. For this purpose the apperceptive complex that is aroused through stimulation must be either a residue of, or disposition to, conceptual ideas. This purpose demands, too, that this complex be as rich as possible in the number of its elements, for apperception is the determining factor in scientific observation. Furthermore, an observation is imbued with the spirit of science only when attended by a feeling of interest. Scientific observation is an art: it creates its object as a *type*, after the manner of art. From what has been said of the part played by conceptual ideas in scientific observation, it follows that in it perception and thought interpenetrate. It is not only attentive sensuous perception for the purpose of conceptual determination, but in itself it is a conceptually determined perception of sense. We may accordingly say, from analogy to the judgment, that our observations may be true, probable, or false. The logical theory of scientific observation has to show, (1) what kinds of observation are to be distinguished according to the purposes of scientific knowledge; (2) under what conditions they are valid ; (3) what functions appertain to scientific observation in general. Now though it is not necessary that every scientific observation, *while it is being effected*, should exhibit itself as a completed judgment, yet for the purposes of theory, we must represent every observation by a judgment of observation. If the observation contains only what is immediately given in sense, we call it a Judgment of Perception ; if, on the other hand, there is contained in the observation elements of a reproductive character, aroused through the apperceptive complex, then it may be called a Judgment of Experience. It is clear that the logical structure of such judgments may be very different in different cases. In the simplest cases the processes will be partly those of identification, partly of analysis, and partly of subsumption. These processes are presupposed in *direct* observation, and what holds there may be easily transferred to *symbolical* observation. In identifying observation there is presupposed the conceptually determined apperceptive complex of the object to be observed. The total idea which represents the object of the observation is a *single* idea. As such it is characterized by the fact that the apperceptive complex contains space and time determinations as essential characteristics, though this complex may not be won through earlier observation of the object, but may be obtained by hearsay. In scientific observation for the purpose of Analysis, attention is directed to a part of an object. This process plays such a large part in all kinds of observation that it has often been regarded by philosophers as the only genuine scientific observation. It is indeed scientific observation *par excellence*. In the simplest cases such observations are judgments of perception, *i.e.*, they contain nothing but what lies in the apperceived object. But they become judgments of experience when there enter into the subject, or predicate, or both, determinations resulting from reproduction of earlier perceptions. An observation is one of Subsumption, when its purpose is to determine an object of perception as an example of a class. It serves the purpose of classification. It is in general a judgment of experience. In all these varieties of observational process, the various divisions and distinctions, mentioned in the first part of the paper, cross and re-cross each other.

A. R. Hill.

*Context and Meaning.* Alfred Sidgwick. Mind, No. 15, pp. 281–306.

The problem discussed in this article is the best method of "rearranging some of the terminology of logic in face of a clear recognition that . . . the logical character of any name and of any proposition is to be sought not merely in that name or proposition taken as an independent entity, but as influenced by the special context in which it happens to be used; or . . . that it is *function* rather than *structure* which ought to determine our classification of actual names and propositions."—The most important distinction among the kinds of use to which any name may be put, is that between what may be called its *descriptive* and *non-descriptive* use. If we speak for shortness of 'descriptive' and 'non-descriptive' names, we must remember that no name is *incapable* of being put indifferently to either use on occasion. To make the essential character of descriptive names turn upon actual function is to be led at once into an inquiry into the different kinds of propositions, since it is only in propositions that names perform their functions. When we come to classify propositions, we see that, whatever be their form, in use they must either express a *major* or a *minor premiss.* It will be better, however, for various reasons to speak of the former as *inferential* and the latter as *predicative* assertions. These characters, it must be remembered, do not attach to the propositions as such, but are decided by their actual use. When thus determined the distinction corresponds exactly with that between major and minor premisses. The major premiss is a pure inferential, while it is only a minor premiss which can predicate with a meaning.—When propositions are regarded as constituted by their actual use in a syllogism, they cannot strictly be said to have independent meaning; and yet in speaking at all of their difference of import we can scarcely avoid assuming their independence. There seems perhaps to be no objection to speaking of them *as if they were independent*, so long as we do not allow this assumption to lead us astray. For the majority of assertions come to us in the first place as independent entities, and we are left to imagine uses for them. It is natural that there should be a good deal of agreement as to the special use which best befits a given truth, and in this way we draw convenient rough distinctions like that between assertions of general rule and of particular fact. From our point of view, we cannot in strictness regard the premisses of a syllogism as existing independently of the conclusion — as being put together and the conclusion drawn from them. Premisses and conclusion have no priority the one to the other. They are related as the sides containing, to the angle contained. When the premisses *qua* premisses are fully apprehended, we have already the conclusion; and until this joint effect is perceived they are only incompletely understood sentences. We have further to note that propositions undergo modifications in being combined into premisses. The art of the logician consists in the skill with which he distinguishes between the meaning separately and the meaning when thus combined — *i.e.*, between the degree of definiteness required for each of these two purposes respectively. To change two propositions into connected premisses is to render one or both more definite than it was before. The danger in any syllogism arises from the chance of ambiguity in one or both of the premisses. Hence the importance of the distinction between the 'descriptive' and 'non-descriptive' use of a name. For only the former can produce *ambiguity*, and only in dealing with this is the demand for a definition relevant. It is never the mere *indefiniteness* of a name which gives the right to ask for a definition, but only such indefiniteness as in a particular use produces ambiguity. The controversial demand for a definition is always a quibble, unless it is a request for the removal of an ambiguity, — unless, that is, the assertion is regarded as a premiss, and the word to be defined as the middle term of a syllogism.

J. E. C.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL.

### *Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie.*

R. AVENARIUS. V. f. w. Ph., XVIII, 2, 137–161; 4, 400–420; XIX, 1, 1–19; 2, 129–145.

Our conception of the object of psychology has developed through three stages: the Naïve-empirical, the Naïve-critical, and the Empirico-critical. At the first stage the soul is regarded as an internal entity which forms the direct object of the science, and may be known empirically. In the Naïve-critical period this conception is discarded. The functions of consciousness become the subject-matter of psychology. Even here, however, some kind of a substrate comes to be assumed, and we return to a dualism with the internal as the subject-matter of our science. At the third stage we first divide the world into ego and non-ego, and then rise above this dualism to find that experience, as a whole and a unit, is to be our field, no part of which can be explained without the other. We cannot, at this third stage, separate the world of thought from the world of ideas. To consider the idea of a tree apart from its relations to the external world is contrary to the whole tendency of thought. If we say that all is sensation, we explain the known by the relatively unknown, and reduce the universe in the end to the unintelligible concept of the vibrations of brain-molecules. If we oppose the world of ideas to the external world of things in a spatial sense, we merely oppose the brain and more internal nervous organs to external objects. If the opposition is not made spatially, it is entirely meaningless. If we cannot thus divide our experience into two parts, one of which is the object of psychology, we must accept the totality of experience as this object. The full experience contains both the ego and non-ego in the complexity of their inter-connections. In ordinary speech we abstract from this totality and make statements of the relations between partial elements. Psychology must proceed from these elements, as they are found in common speech in abstraction from their relations, to their union in the complete experience. There we shall have neither inner nor outer, for both will be united. This division corresponds to the distinction between bodily things and affections of sense. Both belong to psychology, since they depend upon the individual and the central system of the individual. This forms the ultimate test of the object of psychology. In our full experience there is no absolute metaphysical difference in kind between the physical and the psychical. If there were, we could not constantly pass from one to the other, nor say that one was the copy of the other. Matter is but an abstraction from the individual members opposed to the central member. The distinction between a central member and an opposing member is that one perceives, the other does not. Logically we can discover no difference between a perceiving object and one that does not perceive. They differ in physical constitution and in function, but we can find no absolute difference between them. In every attempt to state the difference, we find ourselves tacitly assuming that conceivably the lifeless might perceive. We can only state the difference between them by saying that there is a logical relation between the objects surrounding the perceiving individual and the central system of the latter, by virtue of which changes in the environment are accompanied by changes in the central system. This is a functional relation between two partial experiences, no more transcendent and mystical in its nature than the physical and mathematical relations between our partial experiences. The objects of psychology are not different from the objects of the other sciences; they are the same objects regarded in a different way, as dependent on the individual. Not only do we distinguish ourselves from the objects around us, but certain objects to us are themselves subjects to certain of their surroundings. This latter distinction is of the same kind as the former. We regard a mass of matter as a subject when there is a functional relation between the changes in its central system and the changes in its environment. We regard such a mass as a subject, not only when these changes are actually taking place, but also when they can take place if the circumstances are slightly changed. A man is a subject, potentially at least, when asleep, or even in embryo. By further extension of this concept, we see a potential subject in any stage of man's development. We have here the means of passing logically from dead matter to a living subject. The gap between nebulous matter and the human mind may be crossed by direct logical steps, and our world-concept become a world-system.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

*Observations comparatives sur la reconnaissance, la discrimination, et l'association.* BOURDON. Rev. Ph., XX, 8, 153–189.

This experimental study was made for the sake of finding whether there is any established connection between recognition, discrimination, and the association of ideas. To test the power of recognition, the subject was given series of letters, or words in which a single letter or word was repeated. The recognition of such repetition was noticeably affected by the position of the word in its first appearance; by the interest attached to the word itself; by the number of intervening words; and by the rate at which the words were given. False recognitions frequently occurred when some word roused the attention a little. In regard to the theory of recognition, these experiments call attention to the fact that recognition is not to be confounded with localization, nor with representation. It is an intellectual *feeling*, a feeling of an easier and more complete perception. — In testing discrimination, the subjects were asked to mark every recurrence of certain letters in printed sheets. This was tried with pages of printed words and also with pages of letters jumbled together without sense. It was easier to keep count of the repetitions of one or two letters than to keep count of the recurrence of four or five. It was much easier to discriminate letters in the text without sense than in the other text of printed words. The mechanism of discrimination is that of recognition with more effort of the attention. If the recognition is complicated by articulating as one reads, the discrimination is more imperfect. — In the experiments with association, lists of words were given, and an associated word was written opposite each word in the lists. After an interval of two or three weeks, the lists were given again, and certain series were repeated many times in order to determine the individual tendency towards variation. Intellectual instability here is due to the possession of a wealth and abundance of associations. A comparison of the three tables of numerical results shows that all these processes are closely allied, but association and recognition are evidently more intimately related to each other than they are to discrimination.

A. J. Hamlin.

### *De la ressemblance et de la contiguité dans l'association des idées.* C. Dumont. Rev. de Mét., III, 3, pp. 285–307.

The law of similarity and the law of contiguity in the association of ideas being assumed reducible to a single law, some psychologists think that the law of similarity is only a particular case of the law of contiguity. They reason thus: *A priori*, the idea of similarity implies a comparison, and consequently a relation, between two terms. This similarity can be established and perceived when both ideas are already present in consciousness, but it cannot account for the association. Correct analysis of facts will show that where one idea seems to suggest another by virtue of the law of similarity, the suggestion is really made by virtue of the law of contiguity. — To explain by the law of contiguity, however, the facts cited by the adversaries of the law of similarity, is to localize states of mind in certain spaces, or, in other words, to assume an *extended* consciousness. Since this is an untenable hypothesis, we cannot assume a subjective contiguity, the subjective connection of mental states being the relation which the mind perceives between them. Nervous elements, not mental states, are capable of being united by contiguity. But, it may be said, similarity is a relation between two terms compared and present. The association ought to *explain* how the second term is brought into consciousness, and consequently cannot be explained by a relation of the second term to the first. The answer is that the first term being given, the rationality of the relation may cause the second term to appear. In support of this hypothesis, it is necessary to suppose a sort of elective attraction pertaining to each element of consciousness and making part of its essence. A careful analysis of the mental operations involved in artistic creation will show this to be a probable supposition. The results obtained from mental pathology, especially from hypnotism, catalepsy, and somnambulism, all favor the law of similarity.—Though from the psychological standpoint contiguity is unthinkable, from the physiological point of view it is easily conceived. From a correlation of psychological and physiological investigations a general law may be formulated: To associations of ideas by similarity there correspond associations of nervous elements by contiguity. Those who seek to explain the mind by the body might find in this an argument against the law of similarity, since it cannot be explained in terms of movements of the brain and nerves. The mind, however, cannot be explained by the body; neither can the association of ideas by similarity be explained by the contiguity of nervous elements. Similarity is an ultimate fact of consciousness. It shows the depth of the spiritual nature, which organizes, first, sensation, and then, progressively, the higher faculties of the soul.

C. S. PARRISH.

*Ueber psychophysische Energie und ihre Factoren.* K. LASSWITZ. Ar. f. sys. Ph., I, 1, pp. 46–64.

This article is an additional chapter to the author's book entitled *Die moderne Energetik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erkenntniskritik.* Assuming that all physical changes are changes of energy, and that all psychical changes are connected with physical changes in the nervous system, the attempt is made to apply the methods of Energetics in the field of psychophysics. That part of the energy of a system, a change of which corresponds to a change in the conscious state of the system, is called psychophysical energy. It is the movable energy of the brain. Now energy is measured by its factors of capacity and intensity. The intensity factor, or potential, is that upon which the transference of energy depends. When such a change occurs in the brain, a sensation arises. Accordingly, the existence of sensation proves a change in potential of the psychophysical energy. In no other way can the factors of psychophysical energy be measured, since they cannot be determined by physical means. In psychophysics we experience directly the psychical side of the energy factors. For the capacity factor of psychophysical energy the name 'empathy' is proposed. Empathy is then a physical quantity, a physiological brain-function, and is defined as the relation of the whole energy at any change of the central organ to the intensity. Just as sensation depends upon the potential, feeling is correlated with the capacity factor of psychophysical energy. Increase of empathy indicates pleasure; decrease, pain. The absolute value of the empathy is the measure of attention. Although neither empathy nor potential is determinable, this theory gives us the advantage of a view over psychophysical conceptions, and agrees with the little that is known about the relations of feeling and sensation.

E. L. HINMAN.

## ETHICAL.

### *Free-Will and Responsibility.* D. G. RITCHIE. Int. J. E., V, 4, pp. 409–31.

The theological aspect of the free-will problem has given place in modern times to the scientific aspect, involving a supposed conflict between causal necessity on the one hand and moral responsibility on the other. Let us examine more closely the meaning of these terms. (1) Scientific 'necessity' means only that nature is an intelligible whole. The opponents of necessity confuse it with fatalism — its very opposite. "Necessity means an orderly, intelligible world, in which like causes produce like events. Fatalism implies a chaotic world in which events may happen anyhow, or at least in which there are arbitrary interferences with the orderly sequence of events." Further, when we speak of man's being determined by the laws of nature, we must not imply that he is determined by something wholly outside himself, for man is a part of nature. (2) What is responsibility? I am responsible for an act when my whole personality is its cause. The advocates of free-will, in accepting this statement, regard one's whole personality as something incapable of further analysis. We must analyze our personalities into the effects of experience; the causal chain must not be broken. The opponents of determinism try to break it in three ways. They maintain (1) that we can act without motives, or (2) that we make our own motives, or (3) that while we seldom act without motives yet, occasionally, by a kind of miracle, we do. The second view simply puts the indeterminism one step further back, and the third introduces the unscientific concept of chance. One reason why we are apt to believe we could have acted otherwise in a given emergency, is that in calm retrospection we underestimate the strength of the motive which actually determined us. The mere fact of indecision does not prove free-will. Surely a man need not act hesitatingly in order to act responsibly. We are constantly assuming the possibility of calculating the conduct of people in given circumstances, and the inaccuracy of such calculations is due only to the incompleteness of our knowledge. It is often alleged that to deny free-will makes punishment unjust. Punishment has only three proper purposes: (1) the protection of society, (2) the warning of others, (3) the reform of the criminal. None of these is incompatible with determinism, or compatible with indeterminism. For "if a human being can will anything without motives or can will to will without motives, what is the use of supplying him with motives to abstain from evil?" Determinism has suffered from the misconception that the 'character' and 'circumstances' which determine action are invariable. On the contrary, circumstances outwardly the same "are not the same, as antecedents of volition, to persons of different character"; and character is always being modified by circumstances. Too much emphasis has been laid of late upon heredity; too little upon training. People sometimes speak as if determinism were a practically dangerous doctrine. But free-will is practically dangerous if it leads us to underestimate the effect of circumstances. True, free-will is useful so far as it leads a man to believe in the possibility of improvement. But there is nothing in a determinism which holds character to be variable, that need contradict this belief. Moreover, such a doctrine as that of irresistible grace, totally opposed to free-will, might be more useful in keeping a man from sin. Lastly, we must notice that man is truly free only when his action is determined by reason.

MARGARET WASHBURN.

*Automatism in Morality.* J. G. Hibben. Int. J. E., V, 4, pp. 462–471.

To the theory of automatism in morality the author opposes the following considerations. (1) The explanation of the higher social instincts by referring them to the lower, is inconsistent with the true principle of evolution. On the contrary, the lower, as containing potentially all that the higher reveals, is to be explained by the higher. Hence, the crude social instincts of the savage are to be understood by comparing them with the moral susceptibilities of the civilized man, rather than with the social instincts of brutes. (2) It is not true that the development of morality and of society have always followed parallel lines. The latter may not be regarded as wholly the cause of the former. Such a theory would not account for the individual reformer who is far ahead of his time. (3) The fact that moral practices appear before the consciousness of Right and Duty does not prove that moral conduct, without a rational consciousness of it, is the essence of morality. (4) The explanation of the genesis of the social conscience by referring it to a differentiation of the nervous system, is not satisfactory since social excitations cannot be investigated in the same way as physiological excitations. The definition of morality as health, of immorality as disease, implies the assumption of the very point in question, *viz.*, the automatism of the will. (5) The statement that morality has no significance except in society utterly ignores the worth of the individual as such, and this our belief in personality and the inherent worth of character will not permit. (6) The acknowledged fact that in the highest known morality *conscious* activity is rare, is not inconsistent with the theory of the formation of habits of morality through conscious effort. The later unconscious movement in the moral sphere is but an illustration of the principle of the conservation of energy. Struggle and will may yet remain as the essence of the moral activity. — Finally, there is in the common consciousness a universal feeling of the superiority of the individual to the external material world in time and space, and this feeling as a psychological reality must be explained rather than explained away, before a theory of automatism can be satisfactorily established.

J. F. Brown.

## METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL.

*The Integration of Mind.* E. MONTGOMERY. Mind, No. 15, pp. 307–319.

The entire content which makes up our consciousness at any given moment exists only for that moment, and then passes completely out of existence. The permanent and identical Something, therefore, which undoubtedly exists, cannot be anything that ever forms part of what is consciously present to us. Out of disparate and successive experiences the notions of 'self' and 'object' are formed. The conscious states, being as such evanescent, cannot possibly afford the permanent substratum for the integration thus manifested. Further, none of our states of consciousness have as such any power to affect other beings. We do not perceive one another's conscious states, and, if we consisted really of nothing but such stuff as consciously appears, we should be wholly imperceptible to one another. But it is certain that we do perceive one another's being, and, therefore, what is thus perceptually recognized by us must be entirely different from our forceless non-perceptible mental states. The specific activities of extra-conscious existences stimulate in definite ways the organic sensibility of our own extra-conscious being, and it is this action and reaction which gives rise to the corresponding conscious states.—As to the nature of this extra-conscious reality which gives rise to conscious content, it cannot be denied that there exists the strongest *primâ facie* evidence that conscious states are an outcome of the activity of that which becomes perceptually revealed to us as brain-structure. Central nerve-structure, therefore, or rather what appears in consciousness as such, is veritable mental structure. It may be objected that this does not account for the identical subject which feels, knows, etc. The morphologically complex individual, however, is an organic unity, and why should not the indiscerptible extra-conscious being, whose activity has power to arouse in us the percept we call its functioning structure, have also power to arouse in itself a corresponding conscious awareness? The one case is no more difficult to conceive than the other. On this view mental integration and development would be due to the structural retention and unification of modifications wrought in the extra-conscious reality through its interaction with the environment.

DAVID IRONS.

*Kritische Studien über die grundlegenden Principien der Mechanik.* H. PETRINI. Ar. f. sys. Ph., I, 2, pp. 204-226.

The ordinary view of the world posits two substances, mind and matter, but science demands unity. Realism asserts that all substances are material. Matter, however, is known only as a construction of mind. Idealism maintains that all substances are spiritual; yet spirit also is an hypothesis, for it does not appear in experience. These metaphysical standpoints, then, are not tenable. What is immediately given as actual is sensation, but we add a substrate. Science, however, must be independent of any particular metaphysical speculation, and therefore Mechanics must discard the view of bodies as real substances. A body is a group of those sensations which compose the so-called qualities of a body. It is from this standpoint that we must construct the abstract theory of Mechanics. Now all bodies are arranged in a simple system of coördinates, so that every point is determined by its relation to other points. Such a system of arrangement is space. Time is that rule which is applied for the purpose of holding to an ordered whole in the change of perceptions. Motion, as change of position in space, can be determined by a single variable, to each value of which corresponds a single value of the coördinates of the moving point. Analytical Mechanics, then, proceeds as follows: Certain geometrical magnitudes are assumed as moving in space during a definite time. The general characteristics of this motion in itself are studied in Kinematics. In Dynamics a fixed number of units of mass is attributed to each moving element; the product of mass and acceleration being called force. The art of determining the force from its given components according to the parallelogram of forces, is Statics. For purposes of the calculus, both force and acceleration are regarded as made up of simple units.

E. L. HINMAN.

## HISTORICAL.

*Lotze's Influence on Theology.* G. T. LADD. New World, No. 15, pp. 401-421.

Although no theological system, or even single theological dogma, can justly claim Lotze as its author, or even as its positive and aggressive expounder and defender, in any one of the modified modern forms which it may have assumed, no other writer on philosophy has perhaps been so widely and sympathetically read during the last decade by those who still maintain interest and confidence in theology. There are three main aspects of the Lotzean 'world-view' which are especially fitted to influence current theological opinion. (1) First in importance and strength of influence is the fact that Lotze's philosophy regards all its problems from a predominatingly aesthetical and ethical point of view, rather than from the purely or prevailingly ratiocinative. (2) Lotze's influence upon theology has also been great in the way of reconciliation. He proposes to give both the mechanical and the spiritual principle unrestricted application to all realms of phenomena. He seeks to reconcile the two views of the world by showing "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfill in the structure of the world." (3) Lotze is a pronounced optimist both as to the possibility of knowing God, and as to man's divine nature and immortal destiny. — Besides these three standpoints the author calls attention to Lotze's conception of the nature of the world-ground. We seem warranted in saying that he is the only philosopher since Kant whose conception of Absolute Being is undoubtedly and definitely such as to be acceptable to a liberal, but truly theistic theology. He construes, defends, and elaborates the conception of the Absolute as a self-conscious, rational, aesthetical, and ethical life. Lotze's doctrine of freedom, although leaving an unsolved and unsolvable contradiction in his system, is no less satisfactory in the eyes of the enlightened theologian. His doctrine of immortality will probably be less acceptable to many of the theologians of the present day. By the 'immortality' of the human soul, we must, he holds, understand a continuous life-development, carried over the dissolution of the organism by actual processes of self-consciousness and of recognitive memory. This view must, however, rest upon the central truths of a dominantly ethical view of the world. Those souls, and only those, who establish for themselves the necessary connection with what has *worth* in the thought, feeling, and plan of the ethical personal Absolute, will attain immortal life.

J. E. C.

*La logique de Hegel.* G. NOËL. Rev. de Mét., II, 6, pp. 644–676; III, 2, pp. 184–210.

In the third article of his series, Noël outlines Hegel's doctrine of Essence, showing it as bare essence, as passing into and absorbing the phenomenal, and in the various phases of reality, until we find essence turning out to be, in very truth, the Notion. In this course we come successively upon the categories of sophistic, of science, and of metaphysic, but the last properly belongs to the field of the Notion.

In his fourth article the author gives an outline of Hegel's doctrine of the Notion, following the original as closely as in his articles on the two previous parts of the *Logic*, and closing with the remark that the categories which subjective logic studies are those which explain to us definitively nature and mind. In the *Logic* are implicitly the other two parts of the system. Noël proposes to show in a subsequent paper the grounds for this statement.

H. C. Howe.